This study investigated the effects of emotional facial expressions, social anxiety, and negative self-evaluation on attention in a nonclinical sample (N = 35). Participants completed the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) , the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Leary, 1983) , and a dotprobe task that measured attentional biases for emotional facial expressions. Results showed that attentional biases for emotional faces were moderated by social anxiety, specifi cally the negative self-evaluation component. These fi ndings support Rapee and Heimberg's (1997) model of social phobia and Fenigstein et al.'s (1975) 
I
n general, people are thought to possess an attentional bias for negative social stimuli (e.g., Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001; Pratto & John, 1991) . This tendency may be adaptive because negative stimuli indicating threats may merit urgent and direct action (Pratto & John, 1991) . Cognitive models of anxiety posit an exacerbation of this bias in people with anxiety (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998) . More specifi cally, Rapee and Heimberg's (1997) model of social phobia suggests that people with social anxiety have increased attentional biases for stimuli representing rejection or aspersion. Facial stimuli clearly have social meaning and have been used to test these theories.
Research on the relationship between trait anxiety and attention to threatening facial expressions has produced mixed results. A number of studies examining initial orienting of attention to threatening faces using a dot-probe task have found enhanced attentional biases towards angry and fearful faces in high trait anxious individuals relative to low trait anxious individuals (Mogg & Bradley, 1999, Experiment 3; Mogg, Garner, & Bradley, 2007 ). Yet, other research employing the same paradigm has failed to provide evidence for such differential biases (Mogg & Bradley, 1999 , Experiments 1 & 2; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg, Bradley, & Philippot, 2004) .
Curiously, research investigating the relationship between social anxiety (i.e., anxiety in response to social stimuli) and attention to threatening facial expressions has yielded more consistent fi ndings. For example, Mogg and Bradley (2002) found greater initial biases toward angry and fearful faces among high socially anxious individuals than among low socially anxious individuals. In light of this evidence, Mogg et al. (2004) Shilling and Reminger | ATTENTION AND ANXIETY that such individuals initially orient attention toward threatening stimuli and then quickly shift attention away from them. The researchers measured attentional bias at time points of 500 ms and 1250 ms following the presentation of angry faces. At 500 ms, they found signifi cant initial biases for angry faces among patients with social phobia, but not among normal controls. However, neither social phobia patients nor normal controls had signifi cant attentional biases at 1250 ms. This research suggests that social anxiety, rather than trait anxiety, may be largely responsible for the initial modulation of attention by negative emotional facial stimuli, potentially as a result of the unique match between social fear and threatening social stimuli.
Mogg and associates' (Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg et al., 2004) fi ndings suggest that social anxiety, as a single construct, plays a key role in the initial direction of attention to threatening emotional faces. However, according to Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) , social anxiety is thought to be a multifaceted construct with two component parts. Social anxiety can be conceptualized as the end result of public selfconsciousness, or thinking of another's perspective of oneself, in addition to evaluating oneself negatively. Theoretically, if people evaluate themselves positively after thinking about how other people think about them, they might not experience anxiety.
To our knowledge, no research has investigated the relations between these two components and attention to emotional facial expressions. The relation between public self-consciousness and attention may be highly variable among individuals depending on their selfimages. In contrast, the relation between a negative self-evaluation and attention may be less variable, because for social anxiety to exist, self-evaluation must have already occurred. Public self-consciousness has been found to be positively (albeit weakly) correlated with social anxiety in previous studies (Fenigstein et al., 1975 ). Yet, it has not been controlled to determine the effect of social anxiety above and beyond the effect of public self-consciousness (i.e., the effect of negative self-evaluation) on attention.
Furthermore, past studies (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2002) have favored screening and selecting participants on anxiety measures prior to involvement in research; thus, this research has not shown the infl uence of lowlevel anxiety on attention. Using nonselected college students could allow the investigation of factors (e.g., social anxiety) involved in a normal sample's performance on the standard modifi ed dot-probe task. Knowledge of the role of low-level individual differences in normal attentional processes may be useful for future research studies.
In order to extend Mogg et al.'s (2004) fi ndings, the present study included the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein et al., 1975) and used a college student sample. We added fearful faces to the stimuli. Based on Mogg and Bradley's (2002) research, we predicted that a group of individuals high in social anxiety would show an attentional bias for threatening faces, whereas a group of individuals low on social anxiety would not show an attentional bias for threatening faces. Happy faces, on the other hand, would produce no groupspecific attentional biases. Furthermore, when the effect of public self-consciousness on visual attention was controlled, the negative self-evaluations associated with social anxiety would moderate attentional biases in a similar fashion.
Method Participants
Participants were 35 students or staff members at a midwestern university, 8 men and 27 women, with a mean age of 23.14 (SD = 5.33) years. There were 6 African Americans, 3 Asian Americans, 23 Caucasians, 1 Hispanic, and 2 who classifi ed themselves as other. The research study was approved by the institutional review board at the university, and all participants gave written informed consent prior to their involvement.
Materials
Facial stimuli. The stimuli set consisted of two Caucasian faces 1 , one male and one female, with neutral, happy, angry, and fearful facial expressions. We conducted a pilot study of 10 participants (all Caucasian) to select these 2 faces from 11 total faces. Participants rated happy, angry, and fearful emotional facial expressions for each face for emotional presence on a scale of 1 (not at all emotional) to 7 (extremely emotional). The male and female face with the highest overall average score (i.e., the mean of the mean scores for each emotional facial expression) was used in the attentional task, M = 5.33, SD = .25, and M = 4.83, SD = 1.35, respectively.
In the attentional task, each facial expression was paired for presentation with a neutral expression from the same model (i.e., man or woman) and counterbalanced between the left and right side of the computer screen for a total of 14 pairs. (Two of the neutral [i.e., fi ller] pairs were duplicates.) Each face was 4.5 cm wide, and the inside edge of each vertically centered face was 5.0 cm from the center of the screen. Hair was cropped Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Brief FNE; Leary, 1983 ) assesses discomfort associated with potential negative social evaluation. Greater scores suggest more fear of negative evaluation. The Brief FNE contains 12 statements to which participants respond 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) characteristic of me. We categorized the participants as having either high social anxiety (n = 18) or low social anxiety (n = 17) by using a median split of the Brief FNE scores.
The overall sample had a mean Brief FNE score of 35.46 (SD = 9.35); the high social anxiety group had a mean Brief FNE score of 42.72 (SD = 6.23); and the low social anxiety group had a mean Brief FNE score of 27.76 (SD = 4.71). Independent t tests found that the groups were signifi cantly different in Brief FNE scores, t(33) = 7.98, p < .01, d = 2.70; but did not differ in age, t(33) = .35, p = .73, d = .12; or years of education, t(33) = 1.34, p = .19, d = .45. Unless otherwise noted, an alpha level of p < .05 was used for all statistical tests.
Self-Consciousness Scale. The Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein, et. al, 1975 ) assesses three constructs, each with a separate subscale: private selfconsciousness, public self-consciousness, and social anxiety. Private self-consciousness is attention to your own thoughts and feelings; public self-consciousness is thinking of another's perspective of oneself; and social anxiety is discomfort around others. The SCS contains 23 statements which participants indicate are 0 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely characteristic) of themselves.
Demographic information form. Participants reported their age, gender, race, and years of education on a demographic information form.
Procedure
Participants initially completed a demographic information form, the SCS, and the Brief FNE. Then, during the dot-probe task, participants were seated 59 cm in front of a computer monitor and asked to respond to the location of a 7 mm target dot presented on the monitor by clicking a left or right mouse button with their dominant hand. On each trial, a fi xation cross (+) was presented for 500 ms in the center of the screen. Then, one of the 14 pairs of neutral and either an angry, fearful, happy, or neutral face was simultaneously presented to both sides of the computer screen for either 500 ms or 1250 ms. Finally, following the faces, a target dot was presented to either the left or right side of the screen. The participants' task was to indicate as quickly as possible on which side of the screen the target appeared. Reaction times were recorded.
The entire attention task consisted of 4 practice trials randomly presented once and 64 test trials randomly presented 3 times (i.e., a total of 196 trials). The 64 test trials entailed 7 conditions: (a) 8 neutral-left/ angry-right trials, (b) 8 angry-left/neutral-right trials, (c) 8 neutral-left/fear-right trials, (d) 8 fear-left/ neutral-right trials, (e) 8 neutral-left/happy-right trials, (f) 8 happy-left/neutral-right trials, and (g) 16 neutral-left/neutral-right (i.e., fi ller) trials. Neutral left/ neutral-right trials were considered divided attention trials because attention was equally divided between both stimulus locations. On the other hand, focused attention trials consisted of one emotional and one neutral stimulus. Focused attention trials were divided into congruent and incongruent types. During congruent trials the emotional stimulus was presented on the same side of the screen as the (to be presented) target. During incongruent trial types, the emotional stimulus appeared on the opposite side of the screen as the target.
Results

Data Preparation
No participants had an accuracy rate approaching chance (i.e., 50%) on the dot-probe task; thus, data from all participants were included in analyses. Incorrect responses and reaction times less than 100 ms or greater than 750 ms were excluded from the data analyses because these reaction time data points were unlikely to have been made in response to the target dot (see Carlson & Reinke, 2008) . In all, 3.57% of the reaction time data was omitted based on these criteria. In addition, attentional bias scores were calculated by subtracting reaction times on congruent trials from those on incongruent trials for the purpose of correlating task performance with social anxiety and selfconsciousness. Positive bias scores indicate vigilance for the emotional face, whereas negative bias scores indicate avoidance of the emotional face.
Reaction Time Analysis of Variance
Participant reaction times were compared in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) with anxiety group (high social anxiety vs. low social anxiety), trial type (congruent vs. incongruent), exposure duration (500 ms vs. 1250 ms), and face type (angry vs. fearful vs. happy) as independent variables. The ANOVA revealed that reaction times were signifi cantly longer for faces presented for 500 ms than for faces presented for 1250 ms, M = 454.82, SD = 50.37, and M = 434.98, SD = 48.71, respectively, F(1, 33) Figure 1) . Post hoc paired t tests were conducted to interpret the interaction, and the Holm's sequential Bonferroni procedure was employed to control experimentwise error. These follow-up analyses revealed that, in the high social anxiety group, incongruent trials elicited signifi cantly longer reaction times than congruent trials (M = 465.01, SD = 54.60, and M = 453.70, SD = 49.71, respectively, p = .02), but no such difference was found in the low social anxiety group, M = 427.28, SD = 40.38, and M = 431.45, SD = 43.69, respectively. No other statistically signifi cant interaction effects were obtained.
Social Anxiety and Public Self-Consciousness
Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted among social anxiety (Brief FNE), public self-consciousness (SCS), and attentional biases. Attentional bias was operationally defi ned as the difference between mean reaction times for incongruent and congruent trials. Scores on the Brief FNE were positively correlated with attentional bias scores for fearful faces at 500 ms, r(33) = .42, p = .01, as were scores on the Public SelfConsciousness subscale, r(33) = .45, p = .01. Scores on the Brief FNE were not correlated with attentional bias scores for fearful faces at 1250 ms, nor were scores on the Public Self-Consciousness subscale. Scores on the Brief FNE, however, were positively related to scores on the Public Self-Consciousness subscale of the SCS, r(33) = .57, p < .01.
Reaction Time Analysis of Covariance
Because of the strong positive correlation between the Brief FNE scores and the Public Self-Consciousness scores, the potential effect of public self-consciousness was controlled in a 2 (anxiety group) x 2 (trial type) x 2 (exposure duration) x 3 (face type) mixed design analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with reaction time as the dependent variable and Public Self-Consciousness scores as a covariate. This analysis allowed an investigation of the effect of social anxiety above and beyond the effect of public self-consciousness. Statistically significant effects involving social anxiety in this analysis are thought to represent the infl uence of the theoretical distinction between social anxiety and public selfconsciousness: a negative evaluation of oneself. The results of the ANCOVA were virtually identical to those of the initial ANOVA. The only signifi cant effects were a main effect of exposure duration, F(1, 32) = 9.67, p < .01, η 2 = .23, and a Trial Type x Anxiety Group interaction, F(1, 32) = 5.63, p = .02 , η 2 = .15. In sum, an ANOVA showed that incongruent trials had signifi cantly longer reaction times than congruent trials, but only in the high social anxiety group (i.e., a Trial Type x Anxiety Group interaction). Because Brief FNE scores and Public Self-Consciousness scores had a high positive correlation, the effect of public self-consciousness was controlled in an ANCOVA. This analysis revealed that the Trial Type x Anxiety Group interaction remained statistically signifi cant.
Discussion
The current research predicted that people high in social anxiety would demonstrate an attentional bias for threatening emotional faces, whereas people low in social anxiety would not demonstrate an attentional bias for threatening emotional faces. Happy faces were not expected to elicit such group-specifi c attentional biases. Our fi ndings support a general bias toward emotional faces, both threatening and happy, among people with social anxiety. The present study also predicted that negative self-evaluation would moderate attentional biases in a manner similar to social anxiety. Our fi ndings support this notion.
Consistent with Rapee and Heimberg's (1997) theory, we found evidence of an attentional bias for emotional facial expressions among individuals who were high in social anxiety (as measured by the FNE), but not among individuals who were low in social anxiety. Mogg and Bradley (2002) found similar results when attention toward angry and fearful faces was measured at 17 ms. The interaction of dispositional and situational variables is a potential explanation for these biases. People with dispositional social anxiety, by defi nition, are predisposed to experience discomfort and fear in the presence of other people (Leary, 1983) . Thus, those with social anxiety likely have increased fear responses to emotional faces, even faces on a computer screen. Such an increased fear response could direct visual attention to potentially threatening stimuli, such as emotional faces. Indeed, research has shown that the amygdala (i.e., the brain's "fear center") responds to threatening emotional faces (Whalen et al., 1998) and directs attention to potential danger (Öhman, 2002; Palermo & Rhodes, 2007) .
It is important that the interaction between social anxiety and trial type involved both positive and negative faces (i.e., angry, fearful, and happy). The current research did not demonstrate effects of face type as did Mogg and associates (Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg et al., 2004) . For example, Mogg and Bradley's (2002) research showed an interaction between social anxiety and trial type only for threatening (i.e., angry and fearful) faces. We used a normal sample and did not screen and select participants on anxiety measures. In contrast, Mogg and Bradley (2002) screened their participants. Perhaps the use of a normal sample decreased the likelihood of obtaining group-specifi c biases for particular emotional facial expressions (i.e., an Anxiety Group x Face Type x Trial Type interaction) in the current research. Nevertheless, this study has shown that social anxiety can substantially affect the outcome of emotional dot-probe tasks in normal samples. It may be necessary to measure and adjust for this variable when investigating normal attentional processes in future studies. Furthermore, future research should involve larger samples to allow for a better understanding of the time course of attention when it is modulated by emotion.
The correlations among social anxiety, public selfconsciousness, and attentional biases demonstrated the convergent validity of the Brief FNE and the Public Self-Consciousness subscale of the SCS. Not only were scores on each measure highly positively correlated, but they also correlated with attentional bias scores in a similar fashion. Importantly, individuals high on social anxiety are thought to have a fear of negative evaluation (Leary, 1983) , which according to Fenigstein et al. (1975) , may involve thinking of another's perspective of oneself, in addition to evaluating oneself negatively. In essence, the perceiver with social anxiety projects his or her negative self-evaluation onto others.
The current research suggests that the evaluative component of social anxiety is suffi cient to produce biased attention to emotional facial expressions. This information is useful in understanding the components of social anxiety that impact behavior and daily living. Future research could explore the effects of other psychological constructs and psychopathologies on attentional outcomes. In sum, the current research investigated the modulation of attention by emotional facial stimuli and the infl uence of individual differences on this process. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2002) , this research indicates that social anxiety moderates the effect of emotional facial expressions on attention. Importantly, it extends the extant literature by examining the effect of negative self-evaluations on attention to emotional faces among normal university students.
